INTRODUCTION
The global inancial crisis in 2007-2009 has hit the real economy of the whole world. According to Dhameja (2010) , this crisis is worse than the great depression crisis in the 1930s. This crisis is spreading to the entire global inancial system. Financial crisis triggers economic consequences of in lation, unemployment, drop in purchasing power and increases public doubt about its ability to provide service. The global inancial crisis led to a bank collapsed in the inancial sectors of several important developed countries (Barth et al., 2012) .
Currently, 465 failed banks in United States closed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) from the Initial crisis in 2008 to 2012, namely New Century, American Home Mortgage, Netbank, Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brother, Washington Mutual, American International Group, HSBC Finance Corporation, and so forth so on (Andrews et al, 2016; Karnitschnig et al, 2014; Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2009) . In Europe and Central Asia region, the inancial crisis has caused the bank collapsed, namely Glitnir, Kaupthing and The focus on the bank bailout has been increased since the global inancial crisis in 2008 in most countries. However, previous studies often discover the relationship between bailout and corporate governance. In this study, bank bailout literature will be reviewed with the focus on the impact of bailout on bank inancial performance and bank risk-taking during the inancial crisis. Multi-step strategy is used to collect the data from 2000 to 2016. From the 7 papers were chosen based on the criteria. This systematic review has shown that the bank bailout has a positive impact on inancial performance, however, it has a negative impact on bank risk-taking for a longer period. (White, 2008; Mclaughlin & Levring, 2008) . In the Asia Paci ic region, it caused the collapse of Lehman brothers in Japan and Bank West in Australia (KyodoNews, 2008; Kramer & Andrews, 2009 ). According to Terazi and Şenel (2011) , an unprecedentedly large number of failed banks has increased the government attention to enacted a range of rescue plans to help banks restore its health and con idence, as well as increase its inancial stability. In 2007, The US Federal Reserve offered a loan to several banks and made more funding available around $20bn, then European Central Bank offered $500bn to assist commercial banks. In 2008, United States launched Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) with the total fund given around $700bn (Guilleń, 2009) , while British Government launched a bank rescue package with approximately $850 billion. According to the International Monetary Fund (2010), Latvia in the Baltic States suffered from the crisis and urged to ask for inancial support. The government support continues until this day. In 2016, Italy government approve to give fund around €20bn to support Monte Dei Paschi di Siena (BBC, 2016) .
A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T
However, previous researchers argue that bailout is making the bank worse in many ways. It increases the bank risk-taking, volatility, and default risk, and create a moral hazard problem (Duchin and Sosyura, 2014) . Unfortunately, this issue is often ignored by the government and other inancial aid bodies because they are focusing on "too big to fail institution" mindset. Also, the cost of the bailout is very expensive. Every decision made by the government will have consequences on bank performance. Gerhardt and Vennet (2016) added that the massive bailout program has increased the question about the effect on government intervention on future bank behavior. Therefore, there is an increasing need to understand the impact of government inancial aid on bank crisis performance and its risk-taking.
To the best of author's knowledge, this is the irst study to create a comprehensive systematic review on this issue. To date, the existing studies have examined the effect of bailout on bank future behavior (Fisher et al., 2012; Dam and Koetter, 2012; Gropp et al., 2011) , impact of capital injections (Duchin and Sosyura, 2013; Berger et al. (2011); Mehran and Thakor (2011) . A critical review of the literature was conducted to address the following question: what is the impact of bailout on bank performance during the inancial crisis? And what is the impact of bailout on bank risk-taking during the inancial crisis?
This study is organized as follows: section 1 present the background of the study, section 2 describe research methodology, section 3 state the result, section 4 discuss the result, section 5 describes the limitations, and section 6 concludes the study.
RESEARCH METHOD Design
Systematic review and narrative are used in this study to present a critical overview of the research topic and evaluate the quality of the previous studies (Ressing et al., 2009) . A systematic review is one type of literature review that collect and summarize all studies based on criteria (Khan et al., 2003) . This systematic reviews aimed to systematically examine the scienti ic literature to understand the impact of bailout on bank performance and bank risk-taking.
Search Strategy
To achieve the research objectives, multiple-step search strategy was adopted from the previous study in the ield of inancial institution (International Finance Corporation, 2013), nurse services (Carter and Chochinov, 2007; Jennings et al., 2015) , and construction management (Hong et al, 2012; Yi and Wang, 2013; Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2015) . The two-step review was used to get a high-quality paper. At the irst stage, the authors created a list of thematic ield group about the bailout. At the second stage, this list was narrowed down to sub-theme focusing on the impact on bank performance and bank risk-taking ( ig.1).
A comprehensive search was carried out under the "abstract / title / keywords". The search keywords include "bailout inancial crisis", "government support inancial crisis", "bailout corporate governance", "bank bailout", "bank performance in inancial crisis", "bailout bank risk", "bank risk-taking bailout". In addition, the search was restricted to the ield of study "accounting and inance", "business, management, and accounting", "economics, econometrics, and inance", "social science". The third step, keywords were combined using AND and OR. The full search code is listed as follows:
ABS-TITLE-KEY ("bailout" OR " inancial crisis" OR "bank performance" OR government support" OR "bank bailout" OR impact bailout) AND ABS-TITLE-KEY (bank crisis performance" OR "bank risktaking" OR "effect bailout") AND SUBJAREA (busi OR manag OR Acc OR econ OR soci) AND PUBYEAR N 2000 AND PUBYEAR b 2017 AND LANGUAGE ("English") AND SRCTYPE (j).
In this study, a range of academic research database is used to collect the data such as SSRN website, Emerald Insight, Science Direct, Proquest, Springerlink, business EBSCOHOST, and google scholar. Science Direct and Emerald Insight have been considered as a database that performed better than another database website (Falagas et al, 2008; Ke et al., 2009; Yuan and Shen, 2011; Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2015) .
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
According to Meline (2006) , the process of systematic review consists of predetermined criteria which are included and excluded from the research. Chambers (2004) added that studies are excluded from the collection of literature if they meet the following criteria: (1) de initely meet one or more of exclusion criteria, (2) contain ambiguous methods, (3) does not contain suf icient data or statistics, or (4) The article types are journals, books, literature review, conceptual study, empirical study.
Articles are written in English.
Exploring impact of bailout on bank performance and bank risk-taking.
All countries which suffered from inancial crisis.
Literature focusing on any types of bailout: government, inancial authority, IMF, and etc.
Inclusion Criteria:
Inclusion Criteria: (2016) The equity ratio is the decisive indicator to predict stress. The aided banks hardly improve their performance indicators after they have been rescued but maintain similar risk pro iles/business models When government set up statesponsored rescues, they should require rapid and decisive action from the rescued banks in terms of business model redesign and structural governance changes. The faster banks restore their resilience, the better they can again contribute to the inancing of the real economy.
Outcome measures Results Interpretation

Bank performance
Gianneti and Simonov (2009) Government recapitalizations increase the value of bank clients, especially if these have high leverage and are therefore very dependent on bank inancing. After recapitalizations, banks extend larger loans to their existing borrowers.
Recapitalizations allow banks to supply larger loans to deserving and undeserving irms alike and that the positive effects on the valuation of undeserving irms are much larger, especially if the amount invested to recapitalize banks is insuf icient to re-establish high levels of bank capitalization. This suggests that capital injections may increase the misallocation of credit if they are not appropriately designed.
Berger, Roman, and Sedunov (2016) Bank bailouts can help stabilize the inancial system, bailouts may be most effective in this regard if they are targeted toward larger banks, safer banks, and banks in markets with better economic conditions, bailouts may be most effective when the systemic problems are at their worst, and one particular form of bailout, injections of preferred equity, appears to work successfully to reduce systemic risk through reduced leverage risk. These indings are only based on consideration of systemic risk.
Bailout program conducted by government or external bodies may affect systemic risk through altering individual bank leverage risk, portfolio risk, or systemic importance. It is also important to analyse the most and least effective bailout program in reducing contribution to systemic risk and help in determine the future effective bailout and additional policies, such as restrictions on common equity dividends or buybacks to restrict leverage risk, tighter supervision or regulation of portfolio risk or limits on executive compensation to offset increased moral hazard incentives, or stiffer requirements for M&A approvals to offset too-big-tofail incentives created by bailouts. (2016) Financial institutions with high bailout expectations assume higher risks than others. In normal times, rescue guarantees to large inancial institutions distort competition in the sector and increase the risk of the other institutions. However, during the recent inancial crisis, increases in the rescue expectation of competitors of an institution, to the extent that they represent a reduction in its chance of bailout, decrease its risk taking.
Bank risk taking
The bailout expectation and the total assets of an institution are associated with greater risk taking. In addition, the rescue expectation of the competitors of an institution also in luences its risk taking. However, depending on the period of analysis, this link can be different; that is, in normal periods, there is a predominance of the channel through which increases in the distort competition, reduce pro it margins, and increase the risk taking of small institutions. During crises, however, increases indicate lower risk taking. It is assumed that the reason is, the higher of an institution, the lower its relative importance in the system and thus the lower its prospect of eventually being rescued.
DISCUSSION
Implications for banking evaluation
Bailout program has supported many struggling banks from collapse. According to Gerhardt and Vennet (2016), there were approximately 114 banks received bailout in the European region during the period 2007 -2013. Bailout program has been launched by the government to avoid the bank collapse, ensure the effectiveness of payment system, and minimize the negative impact on the economy (Grande et al., 2011; Beck et al., 2010; Panetta et al., 2009) . the effects of bailouts may differ across types of banks. Information on the relative effectiveness of bailouts for different types of banks is key to targeting any future bailouts. Choi (2014) stated that recapitalization of stronger rather than weaker banks could more effectively reduce systemic risk.
Berger, Roman, and Sedunov (2016) mentioned that there are few things to be considered before choosing a bailout program. First, when future inancial crises occur and policymakers consider their options, it is helpful to know whether bailouts tend to combat systemic risk versus make the problem worse. Second, bailouts may affect systemic risk through many different channels. Some of them operate through altering individual bank capital and leverage risk, others in luence individual bank portfolio risk, and a third set involves increasing bank systemic importance.
Knowledge of which channels are most effective may be valuable in the design of future bailouts and accompanying policies. Third, there are a variety of bailout methods, including injections of preferred equity, blanket guarantees, extending liquidity support, nationalizations, and many others. Information on whether speci ic types of bailouts reduce or increase systemic risk may provide insights for designing any future bailouts that might be considered.
Limitations
This study has some limitations where it only focusses on bank performance and bank-risk taking, while other indicators can be used for the future suggestion, namely bank ef iciency, bank distress, interventions, moral hazard.
CONCLUSION
The inding from this systematic literature review suggest the emergency government inancial aid do impact bank performance positively. However, the impact of bank risk taking for the future needs to be evaluated by robust research to produce evidence that informs corporate governance development. This will in turn to provide context for further studies and provide an evidence base for government and bank practitioners to ensure the sustainability and ongoing bailout and corporate governance reform model. Journal of Business Studies Vol. 3 No. 1 ( February 2019) 
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